Abstract: We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions u i : n j=1 X j → R has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the characterization of efficient Nash equilibria mainly follows from the analysis carried out in part I. When the payoff functions are individually quasi-Leontief functions the matter is somewhat more complicated. We assume that all the strategy spaces are compact topological semilattices, and under appropriate continuity conditions on the payoff functions, we show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibria using the Eilenberg-Montgomery Fixed Point Theorem for acyclic valued upper semicontinuous maps defined on an absolute retract and some non trivial properties of topological semilattices. The map in question is defined on the set of Nash equilibria and its fixed points are exactly the efficient Nash equilibria.
In section 2 the strategy spaces are partially ordered spaces, or infsemilattices, and the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief on the product of the strategy spaces; all the results follow from the previous analysis of quasi-Leontief functions on partially ordered spaces. Assuming that the constraint sets S i are comprehensive and bounded above subsets of infsemilattices X i , on can characterize efficient Nash points.
In section 3 the payoff functions are individually quasi-Leontief and the structure of the strategy spaces is much more restricted, but more classical; the strategy spaces are compact toplogical spaces endowed with an infsemilattice structure for which the inf operation is continuous, as is the case, for example, for compact sub inf-semilattices of R n . Also, the payoff functions are real valued and continuous. The existence of Nash points in this context does not follow from any of the previously established results and requires some topological machinery. We prove the existence of efficient Nash points using the Eilenberg-Montgomery Theorem and some non trivial facts on the topology of inf-semilattices.
Globally quasi-Leontief games
Finding a Nash point for a globally quasi-Leontief game with n players can be reduced to n independent maximization problems. This is content of Proposition 2.0.1 below which settles the problem of the existence of Nash points for globally quasi-Leontief games under the hypothesis that for all
The next results shows that, under appropriate but by now familiar conditions, a globally quasi-Leontief game has a Nash point which is also a maximal element of the strategy space.
be a globally quasi-Leontief game such that, for all i ∈ [n], S i is a non empty comprehensive (CUC) subset of X i with an upper boundx i ∈ X i . Then
Proof: The set S = i∈[n] is clearly non empty, comprehensive and bounded above; one easily shows that it is also (CUC) since a projection of a chain in the product space is a chain. By Theorem 2.4.3 of Part I, M ax(S) ∩ argmax(u i ; S) = ∅, for all i ∈ [n]; in the proof of Proposition 2.0.1 we take z [i] in M ax(S)∩argmax(u i ; S). Let us see that x ⋆ ∈ M ax(S). Let x ∈ S such that x x ⋆ ; from x i z
[i]
i we have (z
and consequently x i = z
i , and since i was arbitrary, x = x ⋆ . 2 u i of player i is a function of the strategies of the remaining players and not of its own strategy.
, the payoff function of player i depends only on the strategies of the remaining players; more precisely, for all i ∈ [n] and all x ∈ W ,
Let us look at an example with two players.
and, u 2,1 (
2 ) = (1, 1) the payoff of player 1 depends only on the strategy of player 2 and not on its own strategy and similarly for player 2. As one can see, (1, 1) is not an efficient Nash point. But, also, (2, 2) is a Nash point since it is the largest element of S 1 ×S 2 . There is an efficient Nash point: (0, 0). It gives the smallest possible payoff to both players. So, a Nash point that gives the largest possible payoff to both players is not efficient and the Nash point that gives the smallest possible payoff to both players is efficient.
The problem of the existence of efficient Nash points for individually -and therefore globally -quasi-Leontief games will be treated in the next section.
Indivually quasi-Leontief games
Let us start by defining some of the concepts that will be needed to state the theorem from which the existence of Nash points for indivually quasi-Leontief games will be deduced.
We will assume that Λ = R and that all the strategy spaces X i are topological inf-semilattices that is:
X i is an inf-semilattice endowed with a topology for which the inf operation ∧ :
We recall that a subspace Z of a topological space X is path connected if, for all pair (z 0 , z 1 ) ∈ Z × Z, there exists a continuous map α :
An easy induction shows that if C is an inf-convex subset of an inf-semilattice X then, for all finite an non empty subset
Also, a subset C of an inf-semilattice X is inf-convex if and only if the following two conditions hold:
(1) S is a sub-semilattice of X; that is, for all x and y in S, x ∧ y ∈ S and (2) for all element (x, y) ∈ C × C such that x y one has [x, y] ⊂ C.
be an abstract game such that:
(1) the strategy spaces X i are compact metrizable inf-semilattices with pathconnected intervals;
(2) the payoff functions u i : j∈[n] X j → R are continuous and such that, for all x −i ∈ j =i X j and all t ∈ R, the set {z i ∈ X i : We know from Lemma 2.3.1 of Part I that for a quasi-Leontief u : X → R function defined on an inf-semilattice X one always has u(x 1 ∧ x 2 ) = min{u(x 1 ), u(x 2 )} and this implies that, for all t ∈ R, {x ∈ X : u(x) > t} is inf-convex. From Theorem 3.0.2 we have the existence of Nash points for abstract individually quasi-Leontieff games.
be an abstract individually quasi-Leontieff game such that:
In R m with the partial order associated to the positive cone R m + order intervals are path-connected therefore, an inf-convex subset of R m is an infsemilattice with path-connected intervals.
be an abstract individually quasiLeontieff game such that:
(1) for all i ∈ [n], the strategy space X i is a compact inf-convex subsets of R m i ;
(2) the payoff functions u i : j∈[n] X j → R are continuous.
Then N ash G = ∅.
One can easily see that an arbitrary intersection of inf-convex subsets is inf-convex and that the union ∪C of a family of inf-convex subsets is infconvex if, for all C, C ′ ∈ C there exists C ′′ ∈ C such that C ∪ C ′ ⊂ C ′′ ; consequently, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) for all t ∈ R, {x ∈ X : u(x) > t} is inf-convex;
(b) for all t ∈ R, {x ∈ X : u(x) t} is inf-convex.
Let us write
Luo's Theorem applies to a much larger class than the class of individually quasi-Leontief functions; it only requires the payoff functions to be "infquasiconvex" in each variable. But Luo's Theorem, which is derived from a Browder-Fan fixed point theorem for topological inf-semilattices, does not say anything about the existence of efficient Nash points. We will show that efficient Nash points always exists but this requires a Kakutani like fixed point theorem in topological inf-semilattices which can not be, at least as far as we know, established from the single assumption that intervalls are path connected.
Efficient Nash points for individually quasi-Leontief games
The set E(x) does not have to be an inf-convex subset of the product space since x 1 z x 2 with, for all j ∈ [n] and i ∈ {1, 2},
And this is the cause of some complications. The structure of E(x) is the subject matter of the following short sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 3.1.3 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact inf-semilattices with path-connected intervals. If, for all x ∈ i∈[n] X i and all i ∈ [n],
• : X i → X i is continuous then, for all x ∈ i∈[n] X i , the set E(x) is a topological inf-semilattice with path connected intervals. Furthermore, E(x) is compact and it has a smallest and a largest element.
Proof: From Lemma 2.3.2 of Part I, E(u
Since the topology and the inf-operation on E(x) are those induced from i∈[n] X i the inf-operation restricted to E(x) is continuous. We have shown that the product space E(x) is a sub-semilattice of the product i∈[n] X i . Let x 0 and x 1 be two elements of E(x) such that x 0 x 1 . The order interval in E(x) is {z ∈ E(x) :
where [x 0 , x 1 ] is the order interval in i∈[n] X i . We have to show that there exists a continuous path α : [0, 1] → i∈[n] X i such that α(i) = x i for i ∈ {0, 1} and, for all
• (γ i (t)); we have α i (t) ∈ E(u i [x −i ], X i ). Since x 0,i and x 1,i are both in argmax(u i [x −i ], X i ) with x 0,i , x 1,i and since
• is continuous and X i is compact the set of fixed points of
We have already seen that a compact inf-semilattice has a smallest element, let m(x) be the smallest element of E(x). But argmax(
is totally ordered since it is a subset of the totally ordered set E(u i [x −i ], X i ); by compactness it has a largest element M i (x); M (x) is the largest element of E(x).
2 Lemma 3.1.4 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact metizable infsemilattices. If P G is upper semicontinuous then E is upper semicontinuous.
Proof: By compactness it is sufficient to show that the graph of E is a closed subset of i∈[n] X i × i∈[n] X i . We have (x, y) ∈ E if and only if,
be a sequence of elements of the graph of E that converges to a point (x,ȳ).
The sequence (x m , y m ) m∈N also belongs to the graph of P G , which is upper semicontinuous;
Lemma 3.1.5 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact metizable inf-semilattices, and that:
• is continuous;
(2) for all i ∈ [n] and for all convergent sequence (x m ) m∈N of points of the product space i∈[n] X i with limitx, the sequence of functions
Then P G is upper semicontinuous.
Proof: Assume that the sequence (x m , y m ) m∈N converges to (x,ȳ) and that y m ∈ P G (x m ). We have to see that, for all i
Since X i is compact and u[x m,−i ]
• is continuous we can, for ε > 0 choose
Lemma 3.1.6 Assume that the strategy spaces are all compact inf-semilattices with path-connected intervals. If, for all x ∈ i∈[n] X i and all i ∈ [n],
• : X i → X i is continuous then, for all x ∈ i∈[n] X i , the set E(x) is homotopically trivial.
Proof: For all x ∈ i∈[n] X i , E(x) is a compact inf-semilattice; we have seen that it has a smallest element and that it is path-connected. By a theorem of D.R. Brown, Theorem B in [5] , E(x) is homotopically trivial. (1) all the strategy spaces are metrizable compact and locally connected path connected Lawson semilattices;
(2) all the payoff functions u i : i∈[n] X i → R are continuous;
Then, G has an efficient Nash point.
Proof: From the preceeding lemmas, E is an upper semicontinuous map with non empty homotopically trivial values from i∈[n] X i to itself. Each X i has path connected intervals therefore, given two arbitrary points x 1 and x 2 of X i there is a continuous path from x 1 to x 1 ∧ x 2 and a continuous path from x 1 ∧ x 2 to x 2 ; X i is path connected, and a fortiori connected. By a theorem of M. McWaters, [9] , condition (1) implies that each X i is an absolute retract; i∈[n] X i is therefore an absolute retract. Homotopically trivial sets being acyclic, E is an upper semicontinous map with non empty acyclic values from the compact absolute retract i∈[n] X i to itself. By the Eilenberg-Montgomery Theorem, [6] Page 543 Corollary (7.5), there exists x ∈ i∈[n] X i such that x ∈ E(x). 2 Corollary 3.1.8 Let G = X i , u i i∈[n] be a quasi-Leontief game such that:
(1) X i is a compact inf-convex subset of R n i ;
Proof: In R n intervals are path connected; an inf-convex subset of R n is therefore a subsemilattice with path connected intervals. Let x be an arbitrary point of X i and let U be a neighbourhood of x in X i . Choose a neighbourhood V of x in R n i such that U = X i ∩ V and a neighbourhood W of x in R n i such that W ⊂ V and W is inf-convex; W could for example be a box around x. Since the intersection of two inf-convex sets is inf-convex and an inf-convex set is path connected we have that W ∩ X i is a neighbourhood of x in X i that is a connected inf-semilattice contained in U; this shows that X i is a locally connected Lawson semilattice. 2
A final remark: The algebraic and the topological assumptions used throughout this paper are not as different as one could believe. The compactness assumption is natural and at the same time seems to be somewhat indeterminate but, as a matter of fact, there is at most one topology on a given semillatice for which it is a compact topological semilattice and continuity is defined entirely in terms of order convergence. For a lattice, that topology is explicitely determined by the algebraic structure of the lattice. For this, and more and topological lattices and semilattices see Theorem 15 and Corollary 16 in [7] .
